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identifying and removing jurors who 
would "not be able impartially to fol-
low the court's instructions and evalu-
ate the evidence." Id. (quoting Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 
188 (1981». The Court, therefore, 
reiterated that because there was a right 
to challenge a juror based on bias, then 
there remained the right to propose 
questions designed to uncover bias. 
The trial judge would thereafter be 
responsible for determining if the chal-
lenge was proper. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2232. . 
Finally, the Court addressed the 
remaining issue of whether questions 
propounded by the trial court were 
sufficient to satisfy the petitioner's right 
to due process. Id. The Court deter-
mined that jurors who would ''unalter-
ably" either oppose or propose the 
death penalty in every case were inca-
pable of following the law in the per-
formance of their duties. Id. at 2233. 
The Court, therefore, concluded that a 
trial court's general questions concern-
ing fairness and impartiality would be 
insufficient to identify jurors with bi-
ased views about the death penalty. It 
would be possible, the Court added, for 
jurors to intend to uphold the law, but 
be unaware that dogmatic beliefs about 
the death penalty would prevent them 
from doing so. Id. The petitioner was 
thus entitled to ask specific questions 
which would identify jurors with pre-
determined opinions about whether or 
not to impose the death penalty regard-
less ofthe facts of the case. Id. at 2233. 
The Supreme Court in Morgan v. 
Illinois established that the Due Pro-
cess Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amend-
ment enables a capital defendant to 
challenge and remove for cause jurors 
whose views on capital punishment 
would lead them to automatically vote 
for the death penalty upon conviction. 
The decision is a significant victory for 
capital defendants and their attorneys 
because it aids their ability to ferret out 
jurors who hold unreasonable convic-
tions concerning capital punishment. 
Because most people perceive them-
selves as fair, general questions con-
ceming an individual's ability to judge 
fairly are insufficient inquiry for the 
purposes of identifying partiality 
among jurors. Furthermore, the inclu-
sion of capital defendants among those 
possessed with the ability to impose a 
Witherspoon inquiry balances the scales 
between the State's and the defendant's 
ability to successfully challenge jurors 
and remove them for cause. 
- Kim Germaine Judd 
New York v. United Stllles: TAKE 
TITLE PROVISION OF LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
POLICY AMENDMENT ACT 
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In New York v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that the ''take 
title" provision of the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Amendment 
Actofl985 violatedtheTenthAmend-
ment of the United States Constitu-
tion. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court resolved a constitutional issue of 
the proper division of authority be-
tween the Federal Government and the 
States. The Court decided that al-
though Congress may encourage a state 
to provide for the disposal oflow level 
radioactive waste generated within its 
borders, it may not compel a state to do 
so. 
At the end ofthe 1970's, Congress 
faced an environmental crisis in the 
disposal oflow level radioactive waste. 
This type of waste, generated from 
sources as disparate as smoke alarms 
and medical fluids, must be isolated 
from humans for up to hundreds of 
years. Despite a crucial need for re-
positories of such waste, the number of 
disposal sites had dwindled. By 1979, 
the only operating disposal site in the 
country was in South Carolina. There-
fore, that state alone bore the burden of 
storing low level radioactive waste pro-
duced throughout the nation. To avert 
disaster, Congress responded by en-
acting the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act of 1980 ("1980 
Act"). The 1980 Act held each State 
responsible for the disposal of waste 
that it generated. A State could dispose 
of its waste at a disposal facility lo-
cated either within its borders or in 
another State with which it had reached 
a regional compact agreement. B~ 
cause the 1980 Act carried no penalty 
for non-compliance, by 1985 thirty-
one states had not joined a regional 
compact and were due to be excluded, 
leaving them no assured outlet for their 
low level radioactive waste. 
Faced with this prospect, Congress 
passed the Low-Level Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 ("1985 
Act"). Three incentives were created 
to encourage states to provide for dis-
posal of waste generated within their 
borders. First, monetary incentives in 
the form of payments from a desig-
nated escrow account would be made 
to States that complied with the statute's 
deadlines. Second, the deadlines were 
linked to access to the sites; thus, States 
that did not comply would be assessed 
progressively higher surcharges and 
eventually denied access completely. 
The third provision required that each 
State which failed to comply with the 
established deadline take title to the 
waste generated within its borders and 
be held liable for all damages incurred 
as a consequence of the State's failure 
to take possession. 
The State of New York chose to 
conform to the Act's requirements by 
passing legislation to provide for the 
siting and financing of a disposal facil-
ity in its state. The State ofNew York 
and residents of two of the counties in 
which sites had been proposed filed 
suit against the United States in the 
United States District Court for the 
NorthemDistrictofNewYorkseeking 
a declaratory judgment that the 1985 
Act was unconstitutional. They ac-
knowledged that Congress could regu-
late interstate commerce in waste ma-
terial under the Commerce Clause and 
that Congress could use the Supremacy 
Clause to pre-empt state regulation of 
radioactive waste. They claimed, how-
ever, that by directing the states to 
regulate in this field, Congress vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment. Nevada, 
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South Carolina and Washington inter- Commerce Clause. [d. at 2426. Fur-
venedas defendants. The United States thermore, Congress's appropriation of 
District Court for the Northern District money from the escrow account was 
of New York dismissed the Petition- found to be a valid exercise of its· 
ers' complaint and the Second Circuit Spending Clause authority because the 
Court of Appeals affmned conditions imposed were related to the 
The United States Supreme Court purpose of the expenditure. [d. 
o began its analysis by observing that . Second, the Court found that the 
this case, like many others, required it access incentives were sound because 
to determine which powers were given they fell within Congressional power 
to the Fedeml Government and which which allowed States to discriminate 
were reserved to the States under the against interstate commerce. [d. at 
Tenth Amendment. [d. at 2417. The 2427. The Court held that Congress is 
Court applied the framework laid out permitted to offer States the choice of 
in the Constitution to ascertain whether either regulating the disposal of waste 
any of the three incentives of the Act according to fedeml standards or hav-
violated the allocation of power be- ing their laws pre-empted. [do In this 
tween fedeml and state authority. [do at way, the State's residents always re-
2418. tain the right to choose how to spend 
After examining the long history of the State's resources. [do Therefore, 
the battle between the Fedeml Govern- the Court held that the 1985 Act's 
ment and the States, the Court empha- access incentive was a legitimate exer-
sized that although the Court will not cise of the Commerce Clause power 
allow Congress to coerce a State to and did not intrude on the Tenth 
regulate in a specific fashion, there are Amendment. [do 
two types of incentives that may be Unlike the monetary and access 
used to influence the States. [d. at provisions, however, the Court held 
2423. First, Congress may attach con- that the take title "incentive" was coer-
ditions which relate to the fedeml spend- civeo [d. at 2428. Congress offered the 
ing power on receipt of fedeml funds. States a "choice" to take title to the 
[d. Second, where Congress is em- mdioactive waste and become liable 
powered to regulate private activity for all damages suffered or to regulate 
under the Commerce Clause, it can according to Congress's instructions. 
offer States a choice of regulating ac- [do at 2428. Petitioners claimed there 
cording to fedeml standards or having was no real choice because Congress 
its state law pre-empted by fedeml lacked the power to offer either option. 
regulations. [d. at 2424. The Court [do 
recognized that the benefit of having 
incentives to regulate over compelled 
regulation is that "state governments 
remain responsive to the local 
electorate's preferences; [and] state 
officials remain accountable to the 
The Court stated that requiring 
States to be liable for the generator's 
damages was similarto requiring them 
to assume liabilities of their particular 
residents. [d The Court asserted that 
this would commandeer States into 
serving fedeml regulatory goals and 
would be inconsistent with the 
Constitution's allocation of authority 
between fedeml and state governments. 
[do at 2428. The Court also found that 
people." [do 
Next, the Court analyzed the three 
incentives Congress offered to encour-
age the States' compliance with the 
1985 Act. First, the Court held that 
Congress may authorize States to im-
pose surcharges on waste received from 
other states. [d. at 2425. The Court 
found that the collection of this sur-
charge was no more than a permissible 
tax on interstate commerce under the 
regulating under Congress's direction 
would impermissibly compel state leg-
islatures to implement Congress's leg-
islation. [d. 
Because both alternatives were be-
yond Congressional authority, the 
Court emphasized that Congress may 
not force states to make a "choice" 
which really amounted to no choice at 
all. [do The Court found that no matter 
what option the State chose, it would 
have to follow Congress's directives. 
[d The Supreme Court therefore held 
that whether the take title incentive lay 
outside Congress's enumerated pow-
ers or violated the Tenth Amendment, 
it was inconsistent with the fedeml 
structure ofthe United States Constitu-
tion. [do at 2429. 
After reaching this conclusion, the 
Court rejected the arguments offered 
by the United States, explaining that 
they were inadequate to uphold the 
''take title" provision. The Court found 
that no matter how powerful the fed-
eml interest, Congress was not consti-
tutionallypennitted to require the states 
to regulate and that controlling inter-
state commerce by ordering states to 
regulate went against the intent of the 
Fmmers. [do at 2429-30. Finally, the 
sited State Respondents contended that 
a fedeml statute should not be found 
unconstitutional because it infringed 
upon state sovereignty if state officials 
consented to its passage. [do at 2431. 
The Court held that this type of consent 
cannot be used to justify Congress's 
departure from the constitutional plan, 
because the "constitutional authority 
of Congress cannot be expanded by the 
'consent' of the governmental unit 
whose domain is thereby narrowed" 
[do at 2432. 
The Court concluded with a re-
minder that the Constitution sets out 
our form of government and protects 
against the temptation to concentrate 
power by dividing power among sov-
ereigns and among branches of gov-
ernment. [do at 2434. Although the 
environmental crisis posed by the need 
to dispose mdioactive waste is impor-
tant, the Court stated that it will not 
license extm-constitutional govern-
ment. [do The Court emphasized that 
State governments are not just admin-
istrative agencies of the fedeml gov-
ernment, but instead hold powers re-
served to them underthe Tenth Amend-
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ment. [d. at 2434-35. Thus, the federal 
government can pre-empt state regula-
tion and offer incentives to the states as 
a means of encouraging them to adopt 
regulatory schemes, but it cannot di-
rect the states to provide for disposal of 
waste generated within their borders. 
[d. at 2435. The Court held that the 
take title provision was not a constitu-
tional method of achieving regional 
self-sufficiency in waste disposal. [d. 
By holding that the "take title" pro-
vision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy AmendmentActof1985 
violated the United States Constitu-
tion, the Court reinforced the sover-
eignty ofthe States that is reserved to 
them by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, 
when enacting environmental legisla-
tion, Congress must be careful not to 
infringe on States' power by directing 
their activities. Although disposing of 
radioactive waste is a serious problem, 
Congress must remain within Consti-
tutional bounds when creating more 
innovative inducements for the States 
to adopt its regulatory schemes. 
- Kristen L. OifJ 
Derricott v. State: MARYLAND DE-
CLARESREASONABLE SUSPICION 
FORALA WFUL "STOP AND FRISK" 
REQUIRES MORE THAN MATCH-
ING CHARACTERISTICS OF A 
DRUG COURIER PROFILE. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 611 
A.2d 592 (1992), held that the reason-
able suspicion required for a valid 
search of an individual is not satisfied 
by simply matching the characteristics 
of a statistically-based drug courier 
profile. Applying a totality ofthe cir-
cumstances analysis, the court held 
that a police officer must be able to 
articulate reasons beyond the profile 
that would warrant an invasion of 
someone's Fourth Amendment rights. 
On June 3, 1988, Corporal Michael 
Thomas ("Corporal Thomas") of the 
Maryland State Police observed a 
brown sports car driving at excessive 
speed on Interstate 270. Corporal Tho-
mas pulled the car over without inci-
dent and the driver of the vehicle, 
Darone A. Derricott, ("Derricott") 
readily handed over his driver's li-
cense and registration. During this 
encounter, Corporal Thomas observed 
that Derricott was young, black, and 
wearing gold jewelry. He also ob-
served a ''beeper'' on the dash and 
various papers containing telephone 
numbers lying on the passenger seat. 
A check of Derricott's license and 
registration revealed no irregularities. 
Despite this information and the fact 
that the Corporal had not observed any 
suspicious behavior by Derricott, he 
requested backup and a "drug dog" to 
perform a "sniff search" of Derricott 
and his vehicle. Corporal Thomas' sole 
justification for this action was that his 
earlier observations ofDerricott matched 
the State Police drug courier profile. 
When the back-up arrived, Corporal 
Thomas ordered Derricott to exit his 
vehicle and conducted a patdown which 
revealed no weapons. Corporal Tho-
mas then searched the vehicle. The 
Corporal found and seized a cello-
phane bag containing what appeared to 
be cocaine and Derricott was arrested 
for possession of a controlled danger-
ous substance. 
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, Derricottmoved 
to suppress the drugs claiming they 
were the product of an unreasonable 
search and seizure contrary to his Fourth 
Amendment rights. After the motion 
was denied, Derricott waived his right 
to a jury trial and proceeded to trial 
before Judge McKenna on an agreed 
statement of facts. Judge McKenna 
found him guilty of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance with 
intent to distribute, as well as speed-
ing. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
determine the reasonableness of the 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The state argued that the stop and 
search of Derricott was lawful based 
. upon the limited "stop and frisk" doc-
trine exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment as established in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny. 
Derricott, 327 Md. at 587, 611 A.2dat 
595. The court summarized the law 
regarding stop and frisk, noting that a 
lawful stop requires that an officer 
possess a reasonable, articulable sus-
picion of criminal activity. [d. Once 
an individual is lawfully stopped, an 
officer must have a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the individual 
is armed and dangerous in order to 
justify a frisk. [d. A lawful search of 
the passenger compartment of an auto-
mobile for weapons demands the same 
level of suspicion and is limited to 
those areas to which an individual could 
gain immediate access to weapons. [d. 
The court proceeded to distinguish 
a Terry type search for weapons from a 
Belton search. Unlike Terry, Belton 
does not require suspicion, but instead 
authorizes an officer to search the inte-
rior of an automobile incident to a 
lawful arrest. [d. (citing New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981». Since 
the search ofDerricott's car was not the 
result of a lawful arrest, the court deter-
mined that Terry demanded an 
"evaluat[ion] [of] the totality of the 
circumstances to decide whether a rea-
sonable prudent person in [Corporal 
Thomas '] position would be warranted 
in believing that his safety or that of 
others was in danger." [d. 
The court first recognized that Cor-
poral Thomas' suspicions were based 
solely upon the fact that Derricott 
matched several aspects of a drug cou-
rierprofile. Id. at 588, 611 A.2d at 596. 
Noting that reliance upon a drug pro-
file does not give rise to any special 
legal significance, the court held that 
an officer must demonstrate how the 
observation of elements of the profile 
would lead a reasonable person to de-
termine that an individual is armed and 
dangerous. Id at 589, 611 A.2dat596. 
The court rejected the state's argument 
that a match to the "statistically-based 
profile" established by the police nar-
cotics section was sufficient in and of 
itself to establish a reasonable suspi-
cion justifying a search or frisk. [d. at 
591,611 A.2d at 597. 
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